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Introduction
At any given time, workers should benefit from some flexibility in their work schedule.
There are events whose timing overlap with the workday and rescheduling work, or abstaining from work, to consume a given event may result in higher workers' utility.
Perhaps workers know ahead of time when this event will occur and plan accordingly:
for example during the NCAA tournaments in March, Saint Patrick's Day also in March, or the Presidential Inauguration in January. Similarly, workers will equally benefit from some work flexibility in the face of an event that is unpredictable, such as: bad weather, a natural disaster, or a sick child at home. Even though schedule flexibility is important and valued by workers, we know very little about its prevalence in the United States.
While workers' schedule flexibility has remained relatively unexplored, economists have paid considerable attention to the market hours of American workers. For example, Costa (2000) analyzes the evolution of the workday length of the average American male between 1890 and 1991, Pencavel (1993a, 1993b) analyze the evolution of hours worked by American workers between 1940-1988, and Kuhn and Lozano (2008) analyze the evolution of the length of the workweek of American workers between 1979 and 2006. Similarly, economists have been interested in understanding the tradeoff between leisure and paid labor. Recent research includes Connolly (2008) who shows that weather determines a workers allocation of market hours, as workers work longer hours during rainy days than on sunny days, or Gonzalez-Chapela (2007) who show that as prices of recreation goods (complements of leisure) increase, American workers' hours of work increase as well. A natural extension to ask is whether workers would decrease their hours of labor in the face of an event that overlaps with the workday. If workers value such an event enough, then it is conceivable that they would choose to consume the event rather than do paid market work when the event is occurring.
In this paper, I use the exogenous variation that arises due to the FIFA soccer World Cup to explore the schedule flexibility of American workers during the last 15 years, . That is, unlike events that cater to the American public and may be scheduled at times where Americans reduce their work hours anyway, the World Cup's games schedule and host country choice is determined mostly independently form the U.S.
labor market or the preferences of American workers. Further, as each World Cup is hosted by a different country and played every four years, the time games are broadcast live in America may or may not overlap with the workday depending on the host country where the World Cup is played. This allows me to estimate the causal effect that the World Cup has on changes in a worker's schedule flexibility from three independent sources of variation: across time − comparing year t with year t + i, i = 1, 2, 3; across space − the host country will determine the time games are broadcast live in the U.S.; lastly, the third source of variation is the time games are broadcast live in each U.S. time zone, as each match broadcast's scheduled time will differ across different time zones − potentially the same game will overlap with the workday in a time zone within the U.S. and not in other time zones.
Empirically, I compare deviations in a worker's weekly work hours during the World Cup from his usual work schedule, with the deviations from the usual workweek of a demographically equivalent worker at other times. Importantly, and as argued above, games played in different countries are televised live at different local times, and the I hypothesize that as the World Cup is played in different host countries, the worker's decision to supply less market hours than in a usual work week varies accordingly to the time games are televised in the local time zone: when the games are televised early in the morning or late in the afternoon, Americans will not reduce their hours of work as much as when games are televised between 9:00 am and 5:00 pm locally.
In a sense, my strategy is similar to Hamermesh et al (2008) who analyze the timing and coordination between persons' activities and local television schedules.
My results show that after controlling for observable demographic characteristics, as well as year and monthly fixed effects, American workers reduce their weekly hours of work on average during the World Cup by up to 9 minutes or roughly one out of every ten workers reduces his weekly hours by the time it takes to watch a complete soccer match (90 minutes plus fifteen minutes half time intermission) per week. Most of this change is concentrated among salary paid workers, who reduce their hours of work by 28 weekly minutes on average. Again, this is equivalent to one in three salary paid workers adjusting his hours of work by the time it takes to watch a game, or more likely 1 in 9 salary paid workers adjusts his hours of work by the amount of time it takes to watch three weekly soccer matches. Interestingly, after controlling for demographic characteristics, year and month fixed effects, hourly paid workers 4 do not adjust their hours of work during the soccer World Cup. This difference is significant because the short run opportunity cost of one hour worked less among salary paid workers is arguably zero or very small, while for hourly paid workers the short run opportunity cost of one hour less of work is the forgone hourly wage. To the extent that salary paid workers are associated with white collar jobs, and hourly paid workers are associated with blue collar jobs (Hamermesh, 2002) , this result highlights an important source in labor market differences among workers in the United States with different pay frequency.
Data
In this paper I use data from the 1994-2007 NBER Collection of the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotations Groups (CPS OGR). In order to identify variations in hours of work between households that are surveyed during the World Cup and not, I estimate the difference between the respondent's hours worked last week and his usual hours of work, and I multiply this difference by 60 for ease of interpretation 1 . These two measures are consistent as they refer to the hours of work in the respondent's main job, and the only difference is that usual hours refers to the mode of all workweeks, and last week refers to the hours in the week prior to the CPS survey week, the reference week. 2 . A negative difference between last week hours and usual 1 Multiplying by 60 allows the results to be interpreted in minutes, instead than in fraction of an hour. 2 The question for usual hours is HRUSL1: How many hours per week (do/does) (name/you) USUALLY work at (your/his/her) (job?/main job? By main job we mean) (the one at which (you/he/she) usually) ((work/works) the most hours.) and the question for hours last week is HRACT1: ((LAST WEEK/THE WEEK BEFORE LAST)/So, for (LAST WEEK/THE WEEK BEFORE LAST)), how many hours did (you/he/she) ACTUALLY work at (your/his/her) (job?/MAIN job?). One difference between these two questions in that the universe for usual hours all employed people (lfsr94=1 or lfsr94=2) while for hours last week is only employed currently at work (lfsr94=1). For respondents whose labor force status is employed, not at work (lfsr=2) the hours last week response is missing as they work zero hours last week and are out of the question's universe. The reason why these workers were absent from work last week are (proportion): vacation (53%); illness (25%); child care problems, family or personal problems, hours means that the hours of work last week were less than the hours in the usual week -a positive difference means that hours in the usual week are less than hours last week. The null hypothesis to test is whether the difference between usual and last week hours is zero, and during the World Cup I expect these difference in hours of work to be negative. Hereafter, I will refer to this difference as the weekly working gap. Importantly, I concentrate on the worker's flexibility to change hours across weeks, and am unable to identify flexibility within weeks or days. Omitting the latter attenuates my results towards zero, as I am failing to capture another dimension of schedule flexibility. Further, I am unable to make any statement about changes in total hours worked over the long run due to the World Cup, or any change in the worker's productivity. observations surveyed during February(t), March(t) and April(t); Period 2 contains observations surveyed during May(t), June (t) and July(t); Period 3 contains observations from the August(t), September(t), and October(t) surveys; and Period 4 from the November(t), December(t) and January(t+1) surveys 3 Periods when the World Cup is being played are highlighted in red and a dashed line marks all summers. The data in these figures highlight three facts: First, differences in hours of work between last weeks hours and a usual weeks hours tend to be negative, this is not surprising as workers tend to take days off, holidays, sick leave and vacation. Figure 1 also shows paternity/maternity leave (12%); all other (10%). As these workers worked zero hours last week, I change the value of hours last week accordingly. 3 In these figures I collapse the data into periods of three months just to facilitate the visual representation of the data, in the rest of the paper each period of time is one calandar month.
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that American workers do tend to work less hours last week on average during the World Cup than at other periods, but these differences do not seem much greater than differences in other June/July periods. Finally, these data show that the variance in differences between last week and usual hours is greater among salaried paid workers than among hourly paid workers which is not surprising given that salaried paid workers have more discretion over their hours of work in the short run than hourly paid workers do (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005 the tournament takes a format of direct elimination. The second round is followed by the quarterfinals (third round) which consist of every winner of the second round (8 in total). The winners from each quarterfinal play in the semifinals, and finally the grand final and third place match that are played a month after the tournament started. 
Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy in this paper consists of comparing the difference between hours of work last week and usual hours of work -heuristically this is similar to a matched pairs estimation where we observe for the same observations hours during the World Cup (hours last week) and hours at other times (usual hours of work).
Specifically I estimate the following equation
where G iyt represents the gap between last week and usual hours, W C iyt is an indicator variable that takes a value of one during a World Cup month, and zero otherwise; x iyt is a vector of demographic characteristics that may or may not vary As argued in the previous section, the variation in the choice of host country and therefore times games are televised in the United States is assumed to be exogenous because FIFA's Executive Committee chooses the country where the World Cup will be played arbitrarily. To take advantage of this variation I estimate the following equation:
where T 1 ijt equals one if most of the high profile games during the CPS survey week were televised in region j between 12 am and 6 am and zero otherwise, T 2 ijt takes a value of one if most of the high profile games during the CPS survey week were televised in region j between 6 am and 12 pm, and T 3 ijt takes a value of one if most of the high profile games during the CPS survey week were between 12 pm and 6 pm in region j. Again, for this specification I use the time when most of the high profile games were played during the reference week of the World Cup month and the time is marked with a star in Table 1 . Under this strategy, note that none of the games were played between 6 pm and 12 am in the different U.S. local times, and the omitted category in equation (2) is all observations surveyed in months when the World Cup is not played.
A third specification is:
where M Importantly, as it may be possible that workers show up in their workplace during the World Cup, and they may take a break during the workday to follow the matches but fail to report different hours of work in the data, my results are likely to estimate a lower bound in these differences of the change in hours of work during the World Cup 6 .
Results
Unconditional estimates of equations 1, 2 and 3 are presented in Table 4 , the top panel where not working due to vacation is more common. Again, the estimates in Table 4 are before any demographic controls are added, and due to the fact the World Cup is played during summers, these estimates confound the effect that the World Cup pm and 6 pm workers supply on average 8 minutes less per week. None of these estimates is statistically significant different than zero at the 5% confidence level, but the last two are at the 10% confidence level. Again, and as in Table 5 , there are stark contrasts between hourly and salary paid workers, as the bulk of the changes in weekly hours of work are concentrated among the latter. That is, in column six,
where I restrict the sample to salary paid workers, I find that when games are between 6 am and 12 pm the hours of work decrease by more than 32 weekly minutes, and when games are between 12 pm and 6 pm the hours of work decrease by 28 weekly minutes. These estimates do not seem out of line, and make intuitive sense, as they suggest that one out of three salary paid American workers watch a World Cup game every week when the World Cup overlaps with the work day. Table 4 . Table 4 . Not surprisingly males reduce their hours of work more than females during the World Cup, immigrants tend to reduce their hours more than native workers, and so do Hispanic workers. Surprisingly college graduates tend to reduce their hours more than workers with less education, that is they reduce their hours of work by more than 30 minutes (again, this is after all controls are added, including month and year fixed effects). Similarly, single or divorced workers reduce their hours more than married workers . Finally, young salary paid workers reduce their hours more than older workers do, by approximately more than 30 minutes.
These differences should be taken with caution and rather as supporting evidence of the results in Tables 5, 6 and 7, as I am only comparing point estimates. Because of the small samples that result from breaking up the sample it is hard to make any inference across estimates based on the relatively high standard errors.
Finally, it is not clear whether wages should be included in equations 1 and 2, as wages may determine changes in the hours of work during the World Cup, and preferences for leisure may determine jointly the number of hours of work and wages for a given worker. Furthermore, when using CPS data wages are calculated by dividing usual weekly earnings over usual weekly hours of work, and the denominator of the explanatory variable will also be part of the response variable if wages are added to equation 1. Nevertheless, and assuming that I can identify the role that wages have on the gap between hours last week and usual hours, I estimate equation 1
to include up to a quartic term in log wages, plus interactions between the World Cup variables and log wages up to a quartic term 7 . The results are presented in Figure   III which shows the estimated gap for equation 1 for salary and hourly paid workers and as in Table 4 , again and as in Table 4 the bulk of the differences are concentrated among salary paid workers. Importantly, as we move across the distribution of wages from lowest earners to highest earners the difference in the weekly hours gap between observations surveyed during the World Cup and all other observations attenuates.
That is salary paid American workers at the bottom of the distribution work on average one hour less during the World Cup, and this difference attenuates to thirty minutes for salary workers in the second quantile, and it continues diminishing as 7 As usual hours enters in the left side of the equation with a negative sign and in the denominator on the right side of the equation, my intuition is that a higher hourly wage due to relatively low usual hours will bias the estimate of γ towards zero as higher earnings will be associated with longer last week worked hours we move to the right of the distribution. This result is consistent with Aguiar and Hurst (2008) who show that low earners are more likeley to consume leisure than high earners. Importantly, and different to Aguiar and Hurst's finding, the relationship is concave and differences between usual and last week hours increase as we move from the fourth quartile to the highest earners.
8 .
Discussion
In this section I do different robustness checks to test whether the relationship that the coefficients discussed above are spurious, and they may be capturing some other event or phenomena that is unobserved in the data. The first exercise I do consists on extending equation 1 to add a dummy variable for the months before and after each World Cup. Specifically, I estimate the following equation for salaried workers exclusively:
where B iyt represents a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the observation was by increases in hours of work in the periods before or after the World Cup. This last point is difficult to prove, as inter-temporal substitution of hours of work is more likely within a week or even within a month, and not across months. Estimates for equation (4) are presented in the top panel of Table 9 , the first column presents unconditional estimates and the second columns includes estimates when all demographic controls are added. Importantly, the estimates of λ B and λ A are zero, while the estimate of λ wc is similar to the estimate of γ in Table 4 . Similarly, I estimate whether changes in labor supply during the World Cup are compensated with changes in the hours of work in the months after and before the World Cup across different times when the World Cup is played. To do so I estimate the following extension of equation (2) for salaried workers:
The interpretation of equation (6) Table 9 .
Again, the estimates for months before and after the World Cup are zero once that demographic controls are added. These results suggest that whatever is driving the reduction in hours of work during the World Cup is absent in the months before or after the World Cup is played.
Another robustness check to test whether the results in this paper are spurious is 
and I replicate this exercise five hundred times. That is, I randomly generate 500 placebo World Cup experiments where the month and the year are randomly selected. It is possible that the difference between the estimates of the coefficients in Figure   IV and the estimates in Table 4 
Summary
In today's labor market, workers benefit from having some flexibility in their work schedules, and the ability to periodically supply different hours of work at any given week than during the usual week will result in higher utility for the worker. In this 9 Interestingly, 6 of the 9 estimates with a coefficient of magnitude -28 or smaller include the survey week of January, 1996 when the Atlantic Coast lived one of the worst blizzards ever recorded. While in January 1995 0.4% of salaried paid workers reported an absence for work due to weather and 2.0% did in January 1997, 12.0% did in January 1996. 
